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I. Introduction
Many studies have examined the link between man-
agerial pay and corporate performance. The evidence
to date has yielded puzzling observations, the most
notable of which is that executive compensation does
not seem to have an economically meaningful asso-
ciation with firm performance. Examining the Forbes
sample of U.S. firms during the years 1974–86, Jensen
and Murphy (1990) find that CEO direct pay in the
largest companies increases only by about $.03 for
each $1,000 increase in shareholder value, and CEO
total wealth, including indirect pay-related benefits
(associated with stock ownership, options, and dis-
missal), increases by $3.25. Such small pay-perform-
ance sensitivities are often viewed as inconsistent with
standard agency theory. While different arguments
have been put forth to explain the seemingly small
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Performance thresholds
are commonly used in
executive compensation
contracts. We examine
the contractual nonlinear-
ity associated with per-
formance thresholds and
its incentive implications.
Incorporating a perform-
ance threshold into a
standard principal-agent
model of a linear con-
tract, we show that pay
schemes using a perform-
ance threshold are opti-
mal. By truncating a lin-
ear scheme at poor
performance, the thresh-
old mitigates agency
costs associated with the
downside risk of produc-
tion. Examining CEO
compensation data, we
find evidence of the role
of performance thresh-
olds. As a consequence
of under-threshold per-
formance, the tobit esti-
mator is shown to in-
crease pay-performance
sensitivity, notably im-
proving upon the stan-
dard OLS estimator.
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magnitude of the sensitivity,1 there has been no consensus on an explanation.2
Departing from this literature, recent studies explore issues beyond the
standard broad categorization of compensation contracts that defines whether
managerial pay is sensitive, in a linear fashion, to firm performance. From
examining the complexity and variety of remuneration arrangements in man-
agerial compensation contracts, Kole (1997) argues that the standard broad
categorization ignores many important aspects of compensation contracts and
thus tends to understate contractual incentives. Murphy (1999) details how
different components of compensation, particularly incentive pay arrange-
ments, are structured. Focusing on management bonus contracts, Murphy
(2001) further examines the role of performance standards. This article con-
tributes to this growing literature by examining a significant dimension of
managerial compensation contracts: performance thresholds. The role of per-
formance thresholds is highlighted by a common practice in executive com-
pensation contracts: executives are promised a base salary and are entitled to
receive performance rewards (an annual bonus or long-term incentive pay)
when a prespecified minimum level of performance, or a performance thresh-
old, is met. While this seems to be a prevailing compensation strategy, it has
received little attention in previous studies.3 No evidence has been reported
on performance thresholds in compensation contracts and their effect on pay-
performance relations.
This article explores this issue by examining a nonlinear contract charac-
terized by the presence of a performance threshold. The contract specifies a
linear incentive payment conditional on achievement of the threshold per-
formance. While a simple linear contract is commonly assumed both in prin-
cipal-agent models and in empirical studies because of its technical simplicity,
linear pay schemes are rare in reality. The importance of nonlinear contracts
has recently attracted the attention of researchers examining managerial in-
centives (Gibbons 1997). The search for an explanation for the puzzling ev-
idence presented by Jensen and Murphy (1990) has raised questions con-
cerning the validity of the linear functional form of contracts. Indeed, it is
1. Jensen and Murphy (1990) conjecture that, under disclosure of executive compensation,
public and private political forces impose constraints on the type of contracts that are written
between shareholders and managers and thus reduce the sensitivity. Joskow, Rose, and Shepard’s
(1993) and Hubbard and Palia’s (1995) findings also support the political pressure argument.
Garen (1994), Haubrich (1994), and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) explain the small sensitivity
in terms of agency costs. Given the risk-averse behavior of managers, the compensation scheme
must be structured to trade off incentives with insurance. Under this argument, the small pay-
performance sensitivity is a response of the pay scheme to high risk in production at the largest
U.S. firms, reflecting the shift of the pay scheme from incentives to insurance.
2. Rosen (1992) argues that the arithmetic sensitivity of CEO pay to shareholder value may
understate the incentive strength both because of the model specification and because of the
market-value-based measure of performance used in the empirical tests. Taking into account
option holdings, Hall and Liebman (1998) argue that CEO wealth is strongly correlated to
shareholder value, suggesting substantive executive incentives.
3. Lambert and Larcker (1991) and Murphy (1999) note the role of performance thresholds
in executive compensation contracts.
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theoretically unclear when a linear contract is optimal.4 The nonlinear contract
examined in this article is appealing: while it captures fundamental features
of a performance threshold and incentive pay, it avoids complications arising
from general nonlinear contracts. Examining such a contract sheds light on
the complexity of managerial incentive contracts and provides additional in-
sights into explanations for seemingly weak pay-performance relations.
With a standard principal-agent framework, we show that a finite perform-
ance threshold always exists, which is true even when the manager owns a
small portion of the firm’s common stock. We explain this result as the fol-
lowing. Given the manager’s risk-averse behavior, the cost associated with
the downside risk in production is “increasingly” high; it is more costly to
compensate the manager for his or her reduced utility when firm performance
is poorer. In effect, the manager is not held responsible for “bad draws” giving
rise to exceptionally poor performance. Hence, penalizing the manager in the
case of bad luck does not serve the purpose of providing incentives. Instead,
it requires the firm to offer, ex ante, high compensation to attract the manager.
While simple linear contracts cannot avoid this problem, a performance thresh-
old truncates a linear scheme at poor performance and as a result directly
limits the effect of the downside production risk. This offers an explanation
for the common use of performance thresholds in executive compensation
contracts. Our model yields other interesting results as well. It shows that, in
the presence of a performance threshold, the slope of the pay function may
differ substantially from that in a simple linear contract model. For instance,
the incentive slope in our model does not necessarily decrease as production
becomes more risky.
By examining CEO compensation for a large sample of U.S. firms over
the period 1992-97, we find strong evidence in support of performance-thresh-
old-based incentive schemes. The probability of CEOs receiving incentive
pay is positively correlated with corporate performance, and this correlation
mainly comes from a narrowed range of return performance. The evidence
is more pronounced in annual incentive pay and with respect to the firm’s
accounting performance. We interpret these findings as evidence of perform-
ance thresholds in executive compensation contracts. The intensity of incen-
tives in performance thresholds appears to be strong, particularly in the case
of annual bonuses. For example, a CEO with a 6% annual return on the firm’s
total assets has a probability of 0.91 of receiving a bonus. In our sample, this
significant component of pay has an average value of $545,000, which is 72%
on the median and 104% on the mean of base salary. When the return on
assets decreases to 6%, the probability drops to 0.42.
4. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) describe a model justifying a linear incentive contract.
Mirrlees (1974) demonstrates that nonlinear contracts involving extreme penalties can be superior
to the best linear contract so long as utility can be unbounded. Gibbons (1997) notes that “the
optimal contract is linear only under very special assumptions about the utility function and the
conditional distribution of output” (p. 4).
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When contracts are nonlinear in the presence of a performance threshold,
incentive pay data are censored at zero. Consequently, the conventionally used
OLS estimator is biased. This is verified by our data. Comparing the OLS
estimator for a simple linear contract with the tobit estimator that deals with
censored data, we find that the former essentially underestimates the pay-
performance sensitivity for all components of incentive pay. This underesti-
mation is more serious for components of incentive pay with a larger number
of zero observations. For instance, with the tobit estimator, the sensitivity of
long-term incentive plan payouts to total shareholder returns is 63% larger
than the corresponding OLS estimate. The difference between the two esti-
mators becomes surprisingly large when the comparison is made based on
the elasticity of incentive pay with respect to shareholder value. We find that
the elasticity of long-term incentive plan payouts is 838% higher with the
tobit estimator than with the OLS estimator. Similar findings are obtained on
restricted stock awards. Our findings suggest that the standard OLS estimator
understates pay-performance relations in two respects. First, it undermines the
direct incentive effect of performance thresholds, which, as shown above,
appears to be important. A broad, linear categorization of pay-performance
relations does not reflect incentives associated with a switch from without to
with incentive pay. Second, because of the model misspecification problem,
it underestimates the sensitivity for incentive pay when performance surpasses
the threshold.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section II, a prin-
cipal-agent model is described that employs a nonlinear contract characterized
by a performance threshold. In Section III, empirical results are discussed.
Conclusions are provided in Section IV.
II. Model
Consider the standard agency problem—a risk-neutral principal, the firm,
delegates decision-making or production tasks to a risk-averse individual, the
agent or manager, while the principal does not observe the agent’s effort in
production. Assume a linear production technology,
Yp e , (1)
where e is the manager’s effort in production and  is a noise term that is
normally distributed with a zero mean and a standard deviation j. Consider
a one-period, piecewise linear contract that takes the following form:
w a bY if Y ≥ Y0W(Y )p (2){w if Y ! Y ,0
where is a performance threshold. Under this contract, the manager is paidY0
a fixed fee, w, and receives an incentive award, , when the thresholda bY
is met; a and are the fixed component and variable component, respectively,bY
of incentive pay, where b is the piece rate or incentive slope. When the
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threshold, , approaches negative infinity, the contract reduces to the much-Y0
discussed simple linear scheme.
Performance-threshold-based contracts are commonly used in corporate ex-
ecutive compensation. The contract defined in (2) reflects two important con-
tractual characteristics of executive compensation. First, executives are typ-
ically guaranteed some level of pay, that is, a base salary. While the existence
of the base salary may be also due to operational reasons in compensation
design (i.e., base salaries are used as a position-related benchmark for deter-
mining the level of incentive pay and total pay), base pay provides executives
with a certain amount of insurance. Second, annual bonuses and long-term
incentive plan payments are nonnegative and are awarded based on achieving
a predetermined minimum level of performance. Hence, by using a perform-
ance threshold, executives are effectively immunized from the risk of poor
performance. While it is true that managers may be fired in the event of poor
performance, the expected costs of firing to managers are arguably low. This
is because, for one, the link between managerial turnover probability and firm
performance appears to be weak,5 and, for the other, managers actually benefit
from the existence of golden parachutes that may be arranged under certain
circumstances.
Executive stock options present another example of performance thresholds
in managerial incentive contracts. Stock options give executives the right to
buy a share of the firm’s stock at a prespecified (“exercise” or “strike”) price
for a prespecified term. As executive options are typically granted with an
exercise price equal to the grant-date stock price,6 the options’ payoff is zero
until the firm’s stock price surpasses the current market value. Hence, the
payoff function of executive stock options is a special case of the contract,
(2), where and b equals the portion of the firm’s shares in optionswp 0
held by executives. The threshold performance in this case is the exercise
price.
Piecewise linear contracts are analyzed in some early studies (Weitzman
1976; Holmstrom 1982; Gjesdal 1988). The contracts in those studies often
have two linear functions with an assumed kink where the functions meet.
This assumption is relaxed in the contract function (2). When ,a bY 1 00
a jump in pay occurs at the threshold performance, which, as Murphy (1999)
notes, is the usual case with executive bonus plans. This article focuses on
the role of performance thresholds while abstracting from other complexities
of incentive contracts. For instance, real-world managerial incentive pay, while
5. While the negative correlation between stock-price performance and subsequent CEO
turnover is often interpreted as evidence of dismissal incentives, the correlation is generally weak.
A recent finding by Murphy (1999) casts further doubt on the role of dismissal incentives.
Examining secular changes in CEO turnover-performance relations, Murphy finds that, when
normal retirement is controlled, the relations are weak and have declined over time. He argues
that, based on CEO compensation data during the 1970s to 1990s, it is difficult to conclude that
the threat of termination provides meaningful incentives.
6. Murphy (1999) documents that the exercise price equals the grant-date fair market value
in about 95% of the regular executive option grants.
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subsequent to the discontinuity due to performance thresholds, does not nec-
essarily follow a linear schedule. The contract in this model has been assumed
to be as simple as possible yet flexible enough to capture important qualitative
features of both performance thresholds and continuous incentive pay.
Use to denote the probability density function of . The probabilityf()
that the agent’s output turns out below the threshold, , isY0
Y e0
P(Y ! Y )p f()d.0 

Let be the agent’s utility function, which is separableV(W, e)p U(W ) C(e)
between pay and effort. Variable is the cost of effort. Both andC(e) U(W )
are twice differentiable, and where , , , and .′ ′′ ′ ′′C(e) U 1 0 U ! 0 C 1 0 C 1 0
Given (1) and (2), the manager’s expected utility is
Y e 0
( )E(V W, e )pU(w) f()d U(w a bY )f()d C(e). 
 Y e0
The manager chooses effort to maximize expected utility, yielding the incen-
tive compatibility constraint,

′ ′b U (wa bY )f()df(Y  e)[U(wa bY )U(w)]C (e)p 0. 0 0
Y e0
(3)
The first term in (3) is the marginal utility of effort associated with the incentive
parameter, b, which is the only source of incentives in models describing
linear contracts. The second term presents the marginal utility of effort due
to the presence of the performance threshold. This term is positive as long
as incentive pay is positive (i.e., ) and approaches zero whena bY 1 00
.Y r 0
The firm’s objective is to choose the contract, characterized by
, to maximize the expected net profit, .{w,a,b, Y } E (P(Y, W ))p E (YW )0
Then the firm’s problem is

( )max E P(Y, W ) p e w (a bY )f()d, (4)
{w,a,b,Y } Y e0 0
subject to (3) and the manager’s participation constraint, E (V (W, e)) ≥ V ,r
where is the reservation utility of the manager.Vr
Here we have implicitly assumed that the distribution of Y is well behaved
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in the sense that the first-order approach applies.7 Furthermore, it should be
noted that the contract function is exogenously given. In other words, the
model does not answer the question of whether a piecewise-linear contract
as specified in the function, (2), is generally optimal. This modeling strategy
is similar to that of many previous principal-agent models that are confined
to a simple linear contract. While it highlights the main features of performance
thresholds in incentive contracts, the strategy is useful in avoiding technical
complexity.
Proposition 1.
i) A finite performance threshold for incentive pay exists.
ii) Incentive pay is positive (or ).a bY 1 00
Proof of proposition 1. See appendix A.
The first part of the proposition presents the model’s major result and
predicts a performance-threshold-based reward scheme. We explain this result
as an advantage of performance thresholds in reducing the cost of downside
risk in production. Downside random disturbances are costly to the firm due
to the manager’s risk-averse behavior. On one hand, observed performance
below a certain level becomes less relevant to working incentives because it
is largely driven by random variations in production. On the other hand, it is
more costly to compensate the manager when performance is poor, because
utility is more heavily reduced. A threshold truncates the linear scheme at the
lower end and directly limits the adverse effect of downside production
variations.
The prediction of performance-threshold-based contracts has interesting im-
plications. Because a simple linear contract is no longer optimal, the incentive
parameter, b, in this model can be quite different from its value in standard
principal-agent models. In the presence of a performance threshold, the ex-
pected sensitivity of pay to performance can change greatly with the level of
effort, depending on the function of the contract and the distribution of the
output. This implication is empirically appealing. Being confined to a simple
linear contract, previous studies focus on the global linear sensitivity of pay
to performance. The contractual nonlinearity in our model suggests that a
global sensitivity may underestimate incentive strength because the sensitivity
can be “locally” large.
This is further supported by the second part of the proposition. With in-
centive pay being positive ( ), the model predicts a jump in paya bY 1 00
at the threshold. Because the incentive parameter at this point approaches
positive infinity, the expected pay-performance sensitivity in the neighborhood
7. The first-order approach relaxes the constraint in the general model that the agent chooses
a utility-maximizing action to require instead only that the agent choose an action at which his
utility is at a stationary point. Being more mathematically tractable, the first-order approach has
been the standard method for analyzing the principal-agent problem, though it is not generally
correct. For the first-order approach to be valid, two distributional assumptions (sufficient con-
ditions) need to be satisfied, which are known as the monotone likelihood ratio condition (MLRC)
and the convexity of distribution function condition (CDFC). For discussions on these conditions,
see Mirrlees (1979), Grossman and Hart (1983), and Rogerson (1985).
672 Journal of Business
of the threshold performance can be substantially larger than the global sen-
sitivity. The implication here is that to induce adequate incentives of the
manager, the pay-performance sensitivity may only be relevant locally.
Given the nonlinear nature of the first-order derivatives of the model, it is
difficult to obtain a closed form solution. The following two propositions
characterize the optimal contract for two special cases.
Proposition 2. As production risk becomes sufficiently small, the op-
timal contract will specify a high threshold together with negligible incentive
pay. Specifically, , , and as (where is the first-∗ ∗Y r e ap 0 b r 0 j r 0 e0
best level of managerial effort).
Proof of proposition 2. See appendix B.
Propositon 3. As production becomes sufficiently risky, the role of both
the performance threshold and the incentive parameter becomes negligible.
Specifically, and as .Y r  b r 0 j r 0
Proof of proposition 3. See appendix C.
Proposition 2 illustrates how far our model can deviate from predictions
of standard principal-agent models with a simple linear contract. In these
models, the smaller the production risk, the more variable the pay scheme
becomes.8 Therefore, when risk approaches zero, the optimal contract in stan-
dard linear-contract models will involve a high incentive parameter and low
or even negative fixed pay, essentially letting the agent solely bear production
risk. Our model suggests that, when the performance measure is accurate
enough to reveal managerial effort, a highly variable pay scheme is unnec-
essary once there is a performance threshold for awarding incentive pay. As
the manager can be disciplined by checking whether or not desired perform-
ance is delivered, the cost associated with large pay variations under a per-
formance-sensitive scheme can be reduced by using a performance threshold.
Consequently, the likelihood of the firm’s use of a highly variable pay scheme
is smaller than standard principal-agent models would suggest.
The consequences of proposition 3 are not surprising. When production
becomes very risky, the performance measure conveys little information about
managerial effort and, hence, the effectiveness of either variable pay or a
performance threshold essentially disappears. Proposition 3 together with
proposition 2 gives an interesting implication: because b approaches zero when
j approaches either zero or infinity, the relationship between b and risk is
nonmonotonic. In other words, the highest b is obtained at some intermediate
level of production risk, and thus it is smaller than unity.
In the above discussion, the effect of managerial ownership is ignored.
Previous studies have extensively examined the incentive intensity of exec-
utive compensation and concluded that stock ownership, including option
holdings, accounts for the most important part of management incentives (Hall
and Liebman 1998; Murphy 1999). While it remains unclear how effective
8. See, e.g., Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Rosen (1992), Garen (1994), and Aggarwal and
Samwick (1999b).
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ownership is relative to direct compensation, there is little doubt that equity
holdings play an important role in managerial incentives. For this reason, we
extend the model into the situation where the manager owns a portion of the
firm’s common stock. We find that, when the manager’s equity ownership is
small, the results of proposition 1 still hold.9 This outcome is not surprising,
because, as discussed earlier, the efficacy of a performance threshold resides
in its ability to avoid the cost of the downside risk in production. While
ownership is expected to work as a substitute for the incentive parameter, it
should not undermine the role of a performance threshold in mitigating the
effect of the downside risk.
III. Empirical Analysis
A. Methodology
We now examine evidence concerning performance thresholds in executive
incentive contracts as predicted by proposition 1. Consider the agency rela-
tionship between the shareholders and the CEO of a publicly held firm. In
the ideal situation, with perfect information on performance measures, we
should be able to observe a clear-cut association of CEO incentive pay with
a performance threshold: incentive pay is positive when the threshold is met
and zero otherwise. However, the real-world situation is much more complex.
Given a variety of firm characteristics, different firms are expected to set
differing thresholds and to use differing performance measures in compen-
sation contracts. In particular, there likely are multiple performance measures,
not all of which are observable to the public. Furthermore, firm characteristics
may change from time to time. Hence, given limited information on perform-
ance measures, the public would not observe a clear-cut association between
incentive pay and the presence of a performance threshold, based on any
single, observable measure of performance.
However, we can take the complexities and cross-firm variations in per-
formance measures to be noise and view performance thresholds as a random
variable, . The noise term, y, reflects incomplete public information,Y  y0
which is normally distributed with a zero mean. To econometricians, given
any observed performance, Y, the underlying threshold is either met or not
met, subject to the realization of y. In other words, there exists a probability
of awarding incentive pay conditional on observed performance. To derive
testable hypotheses, we denote the empirically observed probability of CEOs
receiving incentive pay conditional on performance as . Then,H(Y ≥ Y  y)0
YY0
H(Y ≥ Y  y)p H(y ≤ Y Y )p h(y)dy,0 0 

9. Executives of large U.S. firms typically own a tiny fraction of their company’s stock. In
our sample, the median ownership and median option holdings are both smaller than 1% of the
firm’s total shares outstanding. More detailed discussions on the extended model with managerial
ownership are available from the authors upon request.
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where is the probability density function of y. This probability is differenth(y)
from the theoretically defined probability, , which equals either oneP(Y ≥ Y )0
or zero given Y. Figure 1 illustrates the difference between the two. The upper
graph (a) depicts a representative incentive pay scheme with a performance
threshold (e.g., an annual bonus plan), and the lower graph (b) illustrates the
corresponding relationship between the probability of awarding incentive pay
and performance. The dotted lines in the lower graph represent ,P(Y ≥ Y )0
and the solid-line curve represents . The effect of companyH(Y ≥ Y  y)0
performance on the probability is obtained by differentiatingH(Y ≥ Y  y)0
H with respect to Y:
YY0H 
p h(y)dyp h(Y Y ). 0
Y Y 
Because is positive and symmetric and reaches its maximum ath(Y Y )0
, we immediately have the following two hypotheses:Yp Y0
Hypothesis 1. The CEO of a firm is more likely to receive an incentive
payment in a good year than in a bad year.
Hypothesis 2. The positive correlation between firm performance and
the probability of the CEO receiving an incentive payment becomes stronger
as the performance range containing the threshold becomes narrower.
The first hypothesis appears to be very intuitive. It is, however, inconsistent
with a simple linear pay scheme. In a linear contract, pay increases with
performance; when incentive pay is nonnegative, as is the case with executive
compensation, there is no link between the frequency of awarding incentive
pay and performance. The second hypothesis focuses on the intensity of the
correlation between the frequency of incentive payments and performance
(i.e., the slope of H) and further identifies the role of performance thresholds.
We test the hypotheses using the following probit model:
(Award of incentive pay) p a b(Firm performance)  c X . (5)t t i it
i
The dependent variable is dichotomous, having a value of one when a CEO
is awarded incentive pay and a value of zero otherwise. The first term on the
right-hand side, a, is a constant. The coefficient on firm performance, b,
captures the effect of performance thresholds. Two return variables, market
return to common stock and accounting return on total assets, are used in the
test. We do not use scale or level performance measures such as the firm’s
market value or shareholder wealth, because these performance measures (and
hence the corresponding performance thresholds) vary hugely across firms.
We expect b to be positive (hypothesis 1) and locally large in a narrowed
range of performance containing a threshold (hypothesis 2). The third term,
, denotes control variables, which is detailed below. The model esti- c Xi it
mates the latent variable of the probability of CEOs receiving incentive pay,
which is the standard normal dis-Q [a b(firm performance)  c X ] ,t t i it
tribution function.
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Fig. 1.—The relationship between awarding incentive pay and performance. a, A
representative incentive pay scheme with a performance threshold; b, Corresponding
relationship between the probability of awarding incentive pay and performance. Dotted
lines in the lower graph represent , and the solid-line curve representsP(Y ≥ Y )0
H(Y ≥ Y  y).0
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Several variables of firm characteristics are controlled in the model. Firm
size is a potentially important factor that affects the likelihood of rewarding
executive incentive payments. Several previous studies find that firm size is
strongly negatively correlated with the pay-performance relationship (e.g.,
Garen 1994; Schaefer 1998). The implication of this finding is that incentive
payments are more likely to be made in large firms regardless of company
performance. Note also that large firms tend to have a lower expected return
due to, arguably, low risk or low stock illiquidity. Hence, based on return
performance, thresholds in large firms are expected to be smaller than in small
firms, all else being equal. This means that, for the same performance, there
is likely to be a higher frequency of CEOs receiving incentive pay in large
firms. We use the log value of total assets as the proxy for firm size. Noticing
that total revenue or sales are also often used to measure firm size, we also
examine the model using the log value of sales as the proxy, although we
find little qualitative difference in the results.
Return risk is another factor affecting incentive contracts. Standard prin-
cipal-agent theory posits an economic trade-off between inducing managerial
effort and minimizing the cost borne by risk-averse managers.10 Propositions
2 and 3 in the prior section show that this trade-off becomes more complex
in the presence of a performance threshold. As in standard principal-agent
models, the incentive contract in our model depends on output variations. It
is then appropriate to take the firm’s return variability as the measure of risk.
We use monthly stock return data to estimate return variability. More spe-
cifically, the risk measure in a fiscal year is calculated as the standard deviation
of monthly stock returns over the 60-month period preceding the fiscal year.
The essence of incentive contracts is to tie managerial pay with shareholder
wealth such that the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned. To
the extent that CEO involvement in the board of directors affects the moni-
toring role of the board, the firm’s compensation committee’s decision on
incentive pay depends on whether or how CEOs influence their boards. To
account for this potential effect, we use a dummy variable to control for CEOs
who also chair their boards. Furthermore, other firm characteristics such as
asset intangibility, capital structure, capital constraints, and dividend policy
are also important factors that contribute to the firm’s contractual environment.
We use market-to-book ratios, debt ratios, cash flow to assets, and dividend
yields, respectively, to control for each of these factors.11
10. Holmstrom (1979) explores this issue theoretically in standard principal-agent models.
Garen (1994) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) use executive compensation data to examine
evidence of this trade-off.
11. Smith and Watts (1992) discuss the investment opportunity set and firm characteristics
related to the market-to-book ratio, and John and John (1993) motivate the use of the debt ratio
and Core and Guay (1999) the use of normalized cash flow and the payment of dividends as
proxies for cash constraints. Bryant, Hwang, and Lilien (2000) provide comprehensive sensitivity
estimates incorporating these controls.
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B. Data
The CEO compensation data are taken from the ExecuComp database dis-
tributed by Standard and Poor’s for the 6-year period 1992–97. Firm financial
data are obtained from the Standard and Poor’s Compustat, which also contains
monthly data on stock returns. We confine our sample to firms that include
at least 5 years of information on CEO pay and firm financial data. The final
sample used in this study contains 1,198 U.S. companies.
There are various components of incentive pay. In a broad sense, these
components can be grouped into short-term incentive pay and long-term in-
centive pay. Short-term incentive pay consists of annual bonuses, which are
commonly used in executive compensation and, according to the firms’ reports
in their corporate proxy statements, are usually paid upon achievement of
some prespecified threshold performance. Long-term incentive pay includes
three main components: long-term incentive plan payouts (LTIP), restricted
stock awards, and stock option grants. Like annual bonuses, LTIP is usually
paid upon achieving a certain minimum level of performance. It is more
difficult to determine empirically the performance thresholds for LTIP and
their effects than for annual bonuses because LTIP is defined over a longer
time frame. The role of performance thresholds in granting restricted stock
and stock options appears to be less obvious. All these components of direct
incentive pay will be examined in our test.
Stock ownership and prior (or previously granted, unexercised) stock
options provide important indirect pay-related incentives. However, as per-
formance thresholds do not directly apply to managerial wealth that is be-
yond the firm’s control, we confine our test with model (5) to direct incentive
pay, including current option grants. In this article, we focus on the role of
performance thresholds in incentive pay rather than CEO total incentives.
Hence, ignoring privately held equities should not pose a problem in our
discussions.
Selected statistics are presented in table 1. To give a brief picture of the
frequency and magnitude of different incentive payments, we report the four
components of incentive pay separately for zero observations (no incentive
pay) and nonzero observations (when incentive payments were made). Total
pay is the sum of all components of pay, including base salary, incentive pay,
and various fringe benefits or other payments. It is worth noting that base
salary, other payments, and total pay are all reported as an unconditional
variable including both zero and nonzero observations. Because the means
(and also the medians) for nonzero incentive pay do not take into account
zero observations, the total of the individual means is much larger than the
mean of total pay. During the sample period, a majority of the CEOs received
annual bonuses; in only about 19% of the observations, CEOs did not receive
a bonus. Similarly, in the years under study, approximately two-thirds of the
CEOs were granted stock options. The situation with LTIP and restricted stock,
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TABLE 1 Selected Statistics
Median Mean
Standard
Deviation Observations
CEO pay variables ($1,000):
Bonus:
Zero 1,331
Nonzero 330 545 796 5,711
LTIP:
Zero 5,910
Nonzero 359 716 1,200 1,132
Restricted stock:
Zero 5,733
Nonzero 371 856 1,435 1,309
Stock options:
Zero 2,373
Nonzero 559 1,448 4,513 4,669
Base salary 453 502 276 7,042
Other payments 24 127 1,130 7,042
Total pay 1,237 2,306 4,587 7,042
Firm variables:
Total assets ($1,000,000) 1,021 6,829 22,524 7,106
Sales ($1,000,000) 904 3,404 9,057 7,108
Market return (%) 14.4 21.2 50.2 7,004
Return on assets (%) 4.4 3.9 10.8 7,104
Note.—The sample is taken from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database for the years 1992–97. Com-
panies with less than 5 years of data have been excluded. The sample contains 1,198 firms. The term LTIP
denotes long-term incentive plan payouts. Stock options are the values of currently granted options estimated
by the Black-Scholes formula. Other payments include various fringe benefits. Total pay is the sum of all
components of pay, including currently granted stock options. For the four components of incentive pay, zero
and nonzero observations are separately reported. All variables are in 1991 dollars.
however, seems to be the opposite, as these were awarded in less than 20%
of the CEO-years. This difference reflects the fact that LTIP and restricted
stock, though common in large companies, are not so widely used as annual
bonuses and options in executive compensation.
C. Evidence of Performance Thresholds
We start by testing the first hypothesis. Table 2 presents basic probit regressions
of the four components of incentive pay against the firm’s market performance.
The first two columns present the regressions for annual bonuses. In the first
column, the coefficient on the performance measure, return to stock, is positive
and statistically highly significant. When the firm-characteristic variables are
controlled in the second column, the coefficient on stock returns is still positive
and highly significant though the magnitude is slightly smaller and the t-ratio
is reduced. Consistent with hypothesis 1, the coefficients show that CEOs are
more likely to receive a bonus when the firm performs better.
The control variables in the second regression capture the effect of firm
characteristics on the probability of CEOs receiving bonuses. The coefficient
on the log value of total assets is positive and statistically significant; for the
same performance, large firms are more likely than small firms to grant an
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TABLE 2 Probit Regressions of Incentive Pay on Stock Performance: The Basic Model
Independent
Variable
Dependent Variable
Bonus LTIP Restricted Stock Options
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept .752 .370 1.006 1.973 .890 1.520 .435 .642
(40) (2.5) (51) (11) (47) (10) (26) (5.1)
Return to stock .921 .762 .081 .189 .024 .050 .002 .027
(18) (13) (2.3) (3.9) (.7) (1.1) (.1) (.7)
Log of total assets .168 .202 .141 .189
(11) (13) (10) (15)
Standard deviation
of stock return 1.111 8.705 4.099 1.291
(1.9) (10) (6.1) (2.7)
Chairman of the
board .045 .159 .029 .135
(1.0) (3.0) (.6) (3.4)
Market-to-book ratio .003 .007 .003 .006
(.8) (1.2) (.7) (1.4)
Debt ratio 1.507 .152 .005 .853
(12) (1.0) (.0) (7.6)
Cash flow to assets 1.270 1.052 .617 .553
(6.1) (2.8) (2.7) (3.0)
Dividend yield 2.323 1.507 1.325 2.615
(1.9) (1.5) (1.4) (3.3)
R2 .073 .121 -44.3# 10 .135 -54.1# 10 .052 79.1# 10 .047
Observations 6,910 5,712 6,910 5,712 6,910 5,712 6,910 5,712
Note.—The dependent variable equals one when a CEO receives a performance award and zero otherwise. The term LTIP denotes long-term incentive plan payouts. Options are current
year grants. The standard deviation of stock return is calculated for the 60-month period preceding the current fiscal year using Standard and Poor’s Compustat monthly data file. The chairman
of the board is a dummy variable for CEOs who also chair the board. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
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annual bonus to their CEOs. This finding is consistent with the notion that
large firms usually have lower stock returns and, hence, based on return
performance measures, are likely to set lower performance thresholds. More
frequent bonus payments unrelated to performance in large firms are also
consistent with the view that pay-performance relations are weaker in large
firms. This firm size effect, also shown in table 3, is very robust to components
of incentive pay and to performance measures. On the other hand, the co-
efficients on other control variables are not robust and are mostly mixed. In
the following discussions, we will ignore these coefficients.
The results for LTIP, presented in columns 3 and 4 of table 2, are similar
though weaker. While the coefficient on stock returns is still significantly
positive, both its magnitude and t-ratio become much smaller. This is not
surprising because, as a typical long-term incentive scheme, LTIP is awarded
based on the firm’s performance over a few or several years. The role of a
threshold of long-term performance necessarily becomes less evident when it
is examined based on a single year’s performance. This problem is more
obvious with restricted stock, in which awards are less likely to follow a clear
pattern. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on stock returns, given in columns
5 and 6 of table 2, is not statistically different from zero. For currently granted
stock options, shown in columns 7 and 8, the coefficients even become neg-
ative, though none is significant.
The corresponding regressions with respect to the firm’s accounting per-
formance, return on assets, are reported in table 3. While the results are largely
similar to those in table 2, there are two notable differences. The coefficients
show a stronger link between the probability of bonus grants and accounting
performance. This is consistent with the evidence documented by Murphy
(1999) on performance measures for executive bonus plans: while companies
use a variety of financial and nonfinancial performance measures, most com-
panies rely on some measure of accounting profits.
The second difference is that there is a strong negative correlation between
option grants and the firm’s accounting performance. This result confirms the
impression that poorly performing firms are more likely to award executives
stock options. This observation, though seemingly puzzling, may be explained
by the nature of executive options in contrast to traditional incentive schemes.
With traditional schemes such as annual bonuses and LTIP, one examines the
ex post payoffs to CEOs and shareholders. The payoff of stock options to
CEOs, however, is not realized until the options are either exercised or have
expired, subject to restrictions on trading and exercising the options. As in-
centives derive mainly from the postgrants link between payoff and perform-
ance, the main objective of stock options is inducing incentives for future
performance rather than playing a role in rewarding realized performance.
Therefore, performance thresholds may not apply to whether or when stock
options are granted.
To test hypothesis 2, we examine a spline specification that divides perform-
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TABLE 3 Probit Regressions of Incentive Pay on Accounting Performance: The Basic Model
Independent Variable
Dependent Variable
Bonus LTIP Restricted Stock Options
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept .809 .094 1.022 2.019 .893 1.560 .447 .955
(45) (.6) (50) (11) (48) (10) (27) (7.2)
Return on assets 2.412 3.880 .714 1.533 .006 .589 .617 4.927
(15) (5.4) (3.4) (1.7) (.0) (.8) (3.9) (7.3)
Log of total assets .170 .209 .144 .205
(11) (14) (10) (16)
Standard deviation of
stock return .942 8.470 4.047 1.359
(1.7) (10) (6.0) (2.9)
Chairman of the board .046 .155 .028 .136
(1.0) (3.0) (.6) (3.4)
Market-to-book ratio .003 .005 .003 .006
(.7) (.8) (.6) (1.5)
Debt ratio 1.544 .251 .013 .935
(13) (1.6) (.1) (8.3)
Cash flow to assets 2.065 2.277 .047 4.066
(2.9) (2.8) (.1) (6.2)
Dividend yield .319 1.218 1.254 2.304
(.4) (1.2) (1.3) (2.9)
R2 .038 .087 .010 .133 -71.1# 10 .052 .002 .056
Observations 7,034 5,712 7,034 5,712 7,034 5,712 7,034 5,712
Note.—The dependent variable equals one when a CEO receives a performance award and zero otherwise. The term LTIP denotes long-term incentive plan payouts. Options are current-
year grants. The standard deviation of stock return is calculated for the 60-month period preceding the current fiscal year using Standard and Poor’s Compustat monthly data file. The chairman
of the board is a dummy variable for CEOs who also chair the board. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
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ance into three sections: low, intermediate, and high performance. Based on
stock returns, the spline model derived from the basic model (5) is
(Award of incentive pay) p a b (RTS1 ) b (RTS2 )t 1 t 2 t
 b (RTS3 ) c X , (6)3 t i it
i
where RTS1, RTS2, and RTS3 are the returns to stock for the low-,
intermediate-, and high-performance sections, respectively. Specifically,
return to stock if return to stock ! RLRTS1p {R if return to stock ≥ RL L,
0 if return to stock ! RL
RTS2p return to stock R if R ≤ return to stock ! RL L H{R  R if return to stock ≥ R ,H L H
0 if return to stock ! RHRTS3p {return to stock R if return to stock ≥ R .H H
The dependent variable is also dichotomous, having a value of one when a
CEO is awarded incentive pay and zero otherwise. Variables and areR RL H
two critical levels (low and high) of stock returns, which determine the three
sections of performance. The coefficients , , and estimate the sensitivityb b b1 2 3
of the probability of incentive pay to performance for the three sections,
respectively. When the span of intermediate performance, , contains(R , R )L H
a threshold, proposition 2 predicts to be larger than and and largerb b b2 1 3
than the corresponding coefficient from the basic model reported in tables 2
and 3. The spline model with respect to accounting performance is similarly
defined.
Variables and need to be specified such that performance thresholdsR RL H
are most likely to fall within . Without theoretical guidance for a(R , R )L H
benchmark, we determine the two values by comparing different pairs of
and and choosing the one that best fits the data (i.e., with the highestR RL H
in the regression). Table 4 presents the regressions for the spline model,2R
with the upper portion of the table reporting the results for stock performance
and the lower panel of the table reporting those for accounting performance.
The regressions of annual bonuses are reported in the first column. In the
stock performance portion, the coefficient on RTS2 or stock returns within
(25%, 11%) increases dramatically. It becomes two times larger than the
corresponding coefficient in table 2. On the other hand, that coefficient for
the low- and high-performance sections is statistically or economically insig-
nificant. In the accounting performance portion, the result with respect to
return on assets is even stronger: the coefficient on ROA2, accounting returns
on total assets within (4%, 5%), is more than three times larger than the
corresponding number with the basic model in table 3, and it becomes sta-
tistically or economically insignificant for returns outside (4%, 5%). These
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TABLE 4 Probit Regressions of Incentive Pay on Performance: The Spline Model
Independent Variable
Dependent Variable
Bonus LTIP Restricted Stock Options
Stock performance:
Low performance
(RTS1) .565 .299 .441 .090
(1.5) (.8) (1.5) (.4)
Intermediate perform-
ance (RTS2) 2.253 1.440 .980 .229
(11) (3.4) (2.0) (.8)
High performance
(RTS3) .189 .103 .094 .069
(2.5) (1.6) (1.4) (1.5)
R2 .133 .137 .054 .047
Accounting performance:
Low performance
(ROA1) 1.920 3.135 .543 4.717
(2.6) (3.6) (.7) (6.4)
Intermediate perform-
ance (ROA2) 16.470 10.278 2.836 4.863
(15) (5.4) (2.0) (5.9)
High performance
(ROA3) .110 2.951 2.326 5.620
(.1) (2.6) (2.3) (6.1)
R2 .133 .142 .053 .056
Note.—The dependent variable equals one when a CEO receives a performance award and zero otherwise.
The term LTIP denotes long-term incentive plan payouts. Options are current-year grants. Return performance
is divided into three sections corresponding to the three-pieces spline model. The terms RTS1, RTS2, and
RTS3 denote, respectively, the stock return for the low, intermediate, and high performance sections, and
ROA1, ROA2, and ROA3 denote, respectively, the low, intermediate, and high sections of return on assets.
The two critical values of returns determining the performance division are chosen such that the regression
obtains the highest R2. The resulting intermediate performance sections of stock returns and return on assets
for the four components of incentive pay are as follows: for return to stock, bonus (25%, 11%), LTIP (7%,
10%), restricted stock (4%, 9%), options (10%, 10%); for return on assets, bonus (4%, 5%), LTIP (3%,
4%), restricted stock (2%, 5%), options (10%, 10%). The coefficients on the control variables are not
reported. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
observations are consistent with hypothesis 2. While the probability of CEOs
receiving bonuses is strongly positively associated with performance within
a narrowed range of performance that probably contains a threshold, it is
uncorrelated or only weakly correlated with performance either below or above
this range.
In column 2, the regressions for LTIP are similar, indicating a stronger
positive correlation of the long-term incentive awards to return performance
for RTS2 and ROA2. In column 3, however, the regressions for restricted
stock lend only weak support for hypothesis 2. The regressions for option
grants in column 4 again do not show any meaningful effect of performance
thresholds. Instead, in the lower panel of column 4, the coefficients indicate
a strong, uniformly negative association between option grants and the ac-
counting return. This result is very robust to the choice of the values for RL
and RH. In the table, we report the coefficients for (10%, 10%) purely for
convenience.
To show explicitly the intensity and nonlinearity of the relationship, table
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TABLE 5 Point Estimates of the Probability of the CEO’s Receiving
Incentive Payments
Firm
Performance
Probability
Bonus LTIP Restricted Stock Options
Return to stock:
12% .7449 .1033 .1559 .6594
9% .7661 .1017 .1591 .6609
6% .7863 .1032 .1623 .6635
3% .8055 .1112 .1670 .6660
0% .8235 .1196 .1744 .6685
3% .8405 .1284 .1821 .6709
6% .8564 .1377 .1899 .6734
9% .8711 .1475 .1980 .6759
Return on assets:
8% .4026 .0689 .1580 .8519
6% .4175 .0609 .1553 .8283
4% .4325 .0537 .1528 .8024
2% .5634 .0620 .1502 .7742
0% .6875 .0913 .1639 .7440
2% .7934 .1298 .1783 .7117
4% .8745 .1783 .1934 .6776
6% .9051 .1634 .1948 .6420
Note.—The estimates are obtained from the spline regressions (table 4). The term LTIP denotes long-term
incentive plan payouts. Options are current year grants. In the estimation, median values are used for the
control variables.
5 presents illustrative point estimates of the probability of CEOs receiving
different components of incentive pay, using the spline model regressions.
The lower portion of the table shows the effect of the accounting returns. A
CEO with an annual return on the firm’s total assets of 6% is very likely
(with a probability of about 0.91) to receive an annual bonus, a component
of pay of $545,000 on average, which, in our sample, is 72% on the median
and 104% on the mean of base salary. When the return on assets decreases
to 6%, however, the probability drops to 0.42. These numbers suggest a
strong link between CEO annual incentive pay and corporate accounting per-
formance, which is not revealed by standard linear pay-performance sensi-
tivities. A probability of 0.42 of receiving a bonus for an assets return of
6% seems high. This may possibly result from noise in the data and, in
particular, from the complexity in performance measures such as multi-mea-
sures of performance and cross-firm variations in performance thresholds. On
the other hand, the performance effect on LTIP and restricted stock is much
weaker, and the probability of granting options is notably negatively associated
with the accounting measure of performance.
The upper portion of table 5 presents the probability for the effect of the
firm’s stock returns. The probability of awarding a bonus is positively as-
sociated with stock returns, but the association is substantially weaker than
the association with the accounting return. Except for this, there seems to be
no meaningful effect of the firm’s market performance on the probability of
granting any component of long-term incentive pay. These results suggest that
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market performance plays a weak role in a firm’s decision to grant incentive
pay to its CEO. Perhaps because a stock price is subject to many factors that
are beyond the manager’s control, firms may be reluctant to set a threshold
in terms of market performance.12 The estimates also show that, while the
role of performance thresholds is empirically strong in executive bonus plans,
it is economically less significant in long-term incentive pay.
Previous studies focus on the broad linear relationship between executive
pay and firm performance to argue that the pay-performance link is weak.13
Our findings suggest that a simple linear sensitivity underestimates the in-
centive intensity by not taking into account the effect of performance thresh-
olds. In the presence of a threshold, the pay-performance relationship in a
real pay scheme can change substantially with the level of performance. While
a broad sensitivity summarizes a general (or average) relation between pay
and performance, it does not necessarily deliver an accurate message on in-
centives as it ignores the structural details of the compensation system that,
while complicated, contain rich incentive implications. For instance, because
variable pay for performance far below a certain expectation becomes costly
to the firm and less relevant to working incentives, a contract should provide
adequate incentives within a narrowed but relevant performance range. This
is achieved by utilizing a performance threshold.
D. Downward Bias in Pay-Performance Sensitivities under OLS
Having established that performance thresholds represent a significant di-
mension of incentive contracts, a further question that arises is how they affect
pay-performance relations that are empirically obtained with standard OLS
estimators assuming a simple linear contract. A fact of executive compensation
is that incentive pay data are censored at zero. In the presence of a performance
threshold, CEOs do not receive incentive pay unless the threshold, whether
or not observable to econometricians, is met. The implication of this feature
of incentive-pay data is obvious: the pay-performance relationship estimated
with OLS is biased. To verify this bias, we compare the sensitivity of CEO
pay to firm performance between a standard OLS estimator and a tobit es-
timator, the latter being a standard approach to censored data.
We first examine the following specification for this comparison:
( ) ( )Incentive pay p a b Total shareholder return  c X . (7) i itt t
i
The dependent variable is CEO incentive pay in dollar values. The first term
on the right-hand side is a constant. Total shareholder returns are defined as
the product of the rate of return on common stock in a year and the firm’s
market value at the beginning of the year. The coefficient, b, estimates the
12. Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Sloan (1993) discuss the use of security price measures
versus accounting measures in executive compensation.
13. See Rosen (1992) and Murphy (1999) for a survey of the literature.
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arithmetic pay-performance sensitivity in the spirit of Jensen and Murphy
(1990). Unlike in Jensen and Murphy, however, the dependent variable is not
in first-difference form. This is because the tobit estimator needs to identify
censored observations (zero incentive pay). To minimize the effect of het-
erogeneity in firm characteristics, the control variables examined above are
also included in this model.
The model is run separately for different components of CEO incentive
pay. Option incentives are relatively complex and are thus examined in two
parts: one for currently granted options and the other for prior options (i.e.,
option holdings due to previously granted, unexercised options). As a com-
ponent of CEO pay for current or realized performance, currently granted
options are valued using the Black-Scholes formula and then, as with other
components of incentive pay, are regressed against total shareholder return.
Simple linear pay-performance sensitivities are obtained from OLS regres-
sions; the corresponding sensitivities taking into account the censored data
are obtained from tobit regressions.
Prior options provide indirect pay-related incentives through the link be-
tween the payoff of options to CEOs and the firm’s market value. As in
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a), we estimate the simple linear sensitivity of
prior options by using the ExecuComp data on existing options.14 Regressing
the value of CEO option holdings on the firm’s market value yields the OLS
estimate of the simple linear sensitivity. On the other hand, since most options
are issued at the money, the option’s exercise price presents a natural per-
formance threshold. For performance above the threshold, CEO wealth in
option holdings changes dollar for dollar with the firm’s market value due to
the nontradable feature of executive options. In other words, the incentive
slope for performance surpassing the threshold is equivalent to that of stock
ownership. Hence, we estimate the sensitivity by treating prior options as
stock holdings and take it to be the sensitivity for performance above the
threshold, which is the tobit estimate equivalent.
Table 6 summarizes incentive-pay sensitivities to total shareholder returns
for the OLS estimator and the tobit estimator, together with the percentage
changes from the OLS to the tobit estimates. For comparison purposes, the
results are reported for regressions both with and without the control variables.
All sensitivities are positive, statistically highly significant, and with a mag-
nitude mostly consistent with previous studies. The OLS estimator is shown
to underestimate the pay-performance sensitivity for all five components of
incentive pay, though the extent of underestimation varies. With firm char-
14. ExecuComp reports the value of existing options only for those that are currently in the
money. While this data drawback is unavoidably a source of potential bias in estimation, the
bias may be limited. As Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) argue, there are two offsetting effects
of this data problem. On the one hand, the sensitivity of option values to stock prices may be
overstated because of a jump in reported values surrounding the option’s exercise price due to
the reporting convention. On the other hand, the sensitivity tends to be downward biased for
price movements in either direction for out-of-the-money options that remain out of the money.
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TABLE 6 Pay-Performance Sensitivities: The OLS Estimator versus the Tobit
Estimator
Components of
Incentive Pay
Without Control Variables With Control Variables
OLS (¢) Tobit (¢) Change (%) OLS (¢) Tobit (¢) Change (%)
Bonus 7.8 8.6 10 3.1 3.3 6
(27) (25) (10) (9.4)
LTIP 4.1 10.4 154 2.7 4.4 63
(19) (13) (10) (4.7)
Restricted stock 4.3 9.5 121 2.6 4.2 62
(15) (9.8) (7.8) (3.6)
Currently granted options 24.3 30.0 23 16.1 19.2 19
(16) (15) (9.1) (8.4)
Prior options 74.1 123 66 72.6 107 47
(30) (33) (24) (23)
Note.—The estimates are obtained from the arithmetic specification, eq. (7), which regresses CEO incentive
pay against total shareholder return. The term LTIP denotes long-term incentive plan payouts. All components
of incentive pay, including current and prior options, are in dollar values. The pay-performance sensitivities
are the change in CEO incentive pay for every $1,000 change in shareholder return. The t-statistics are in
parentheses.
acteristics controlled, the OLS estimator understates the sensitivity of annual
bonuses by just 6%. This is not surprising because, on average, only about
19% of CEOs did not receive a bonus each year, and so the effect of ignoring
performance thresholds in estimating the sensitivity is limited. This does not
mean, however, that the role of performance thresholds in bonus schemes can
be ignored. As discussed earlier, there is a strong link between the probability
of CEOs receiving bonuses and performance. The incentive intensity of such
a switching scheme is not reflected in simple linear sensitivities.
For LTIP and restricted stock, the difference in the sensitivity between the
two estimators is large. Note that these two components of incentive pay were
made in only about 15% of the CEO years, or about 85% of the observations
were censored at zero. The difference between the two estimators is thus
expected to be substantial. The downward bias with prior options is also
notable. Because executive options are not tradable, the payoff schedule of
options highlighted by the exercise price as the performance threshold presents
a more complicated incentive scheme than a simple linear sensitivity implies.
To further compare the two estimators, we also examine the following
elasticity-form specification:
( )ln Incentive pay p a b[ln (1 Stock return)]  c X . (8)t i itt
i
The performance variable, , approximates changes inln (1 stock return)
when the firm’s total shares outstanding change slowlyln (shareholder value)
from year to year. Hence, the coefficient, b, is an approximate estimate of the
pay-performance elasticity. Whenever a CEO does not receive incentive pay
(i.e., when incentive pay is zero), $1 is assumed for the dependent variable
to preserve the censored observations. The two specifications, (7) and (8),
are both commonly used in examination of pay-performance relations. While
the arithmetic specification is appealing for an intuitive interpretation of the
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TABLE 7 Pay-Performance Elasticities: The OLS Estimator versus the Tobit
Estimator
Components of
Incentive Pay
Without Control Variables With Control Variables
OLS Tobit Change (%) OLS Tobit Change (%)
Bonus 1.927 2.398 24 1.616 2.009 24
(25) (25) (18) (18)
LTIP .476 3.066 544 .276 2.590 838
(6.3) (6.1) (3.2) (4.2)
Restricted stock .363 1.867 414 .210 1.169 457
(4.5) (4.1) (2.2) (2.2)
Currently granted options .432 .559 29 .024 .011 54
(4.0) (3.4) (.2) (.1)
Prior options .893 .608 32 1.187 .833 30
(37) (32) (18) (15)
Note.— The estimates are obtained from the elasticity specification, eq. (8), which regresses the log of
CEO incentive pay against the log of ( ). The term LTIP denotes long-term incentive plan1 stock return
payouts. All components of incentive pay including current and prior options are in dollar values. The pay-
performance elasticities are the approximate percentage change in CEO incentive pay for every 1% change
in shareholder value. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
incentive parameter, the elasticity specification has an advantage in that it fits
compensation data better and the elasticity measure is relatively invariant to
firm size.
Table 7 shows the comparison with the elasticity of incentive pay to share-
holder value. Except for options, the elasticities indicate a much more severe
underestimation with the OLS estimator. In tobit estimation and when firm
characteristics are controlled, the elasticity increases by 457% for restricted
stock and jumps 838% for LTIP. The elasticity of prior options, however,
indicates an upward bias in the OLS regression, which contrasts with the
results for other components of incentive pay and appears to be inconsistent
with the comparison for the arithmetic sensitivities of prior options (table 6).
One possible explanation is that the elasticity of option holdings with respect
to shareholder value is not an adequate measure of incentive strength and so
the difference in the elasticities does not reflect the difference in incentives
between the two estimates. To understand this point, consider two CEOs of
comparable firms, assuming that one CEO has an ownership of 10% of the
firm’s stock and the other has an ownership of 0.1%. If the firm’s total shares
and CEO ownership do not change or change slowly from year to year, as is
the usual case in the real world, one would obtain an elasticity close to one
for both CEOs. This problem applies similarly to option holdings.
IV. Conclusion
In this article, we examine performance thresholds as a significant dimension
of incentive contracts. We show that a performance threshold is efficient in
the sense that it mitigates agency costs associated with the downside risk in
production. After examining CEO compensation data, we find empirical sup-
port for the role of performance thresholds in incentive pay. Contributing to
the literature exploring the complexity and variety of executive compensation
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contracts, we show that standard linear pay-performance sensitivities, by ig-
noring the nonlinearity associated with performance thresholds, understate the
underlying incentive strength. This threshold-related underestimation is two-
fold. First, a simple linear sensitivity does not reflect incentives associated
with a performance-based switch from zero incentive pay to (often substantial)
incentive pay and, second, with the standard OLS estimator, the sensitivity is
downward biased due to the fact that incentive pay data are censored at zero.
Examining the role of performance thresholds undoubtedly enriches our
understanding of the structural complexity of incentive contracts. In this ar-
ticle, we do not address the much debated issue of whether executive pay-
performance relations are sufficiently strong to align the interests of share-
holders and managers. Indeed, we do not examine another important
component of managerial wealth: stock ownership. Because ownership is not
directly controlled by the board’s compensation committee and executive
wealth in ownership is not subject to a share price threshold, issues concerning
performance thresholds do not apply to ownership incentives. Furthermore,
in this article, we ignore a related phenomenon in executive compensation:
firms may also set a cap on incentive pay together with a performance thresh-
old, which is typical in executive bonus plans (Lambert and Larcker 1991;
Murphy 1999, 2001). It is theoretically straightforward to analyze the role of
a pay cap in a contract model similar to that for a performance threshold.
However, it is difficult to identify empirically the effect of a pay cap, because
there is no publicly available information on if an incentive payment hits a
pay cap that is expected to alter both across firms and over time.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Y0 is finite.
Obviously, Y0 would not be infinitely positive because otherwise the pay scheme
reduces to a fixed fee. We need to show only that Y0 is larger than some finite value.
The Lagrange of the optimization problem, (4), is

Lp ew (a bY )f()d
Y e0
Y e 0   l U(w) f()d U(w a bY )f()dC(e) V  r  Y e0
 
′ ′  m (U(w a bY )U(w))f(Y  e) b U (w a bY )f()dC (e) .0 0  Y e0
(A1)
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The first-order derivative with respect to isY0
L [ ]p (a bY )f(Y  e) l U(wa bY )U(w) f(Y  e)0 0 0 0
Y0
′[ ]m U(wa bY )U(w) f (Y  e).0 0
With for a normal distribution, this condition is′ 2f (Y  e)p [(e Y )/j ]f(Y  e)0 0 0
rewritten as
L e Y U(wa bY )U(w) 0 0
p 1 l m (abY )f(Y  e). (A2)  0 0( ) ( )2Y j a bY 0 0
Optimality requires , which means that either the expression in the squareL/Y p 00
bracket equals zero or that . In the former case, becausea bY p 0 [U(wa0
, thenbY )U(w)]/(a bY ) 1 00 0
2e Y lj0
l m 1 0 or Y 1 e . (A3)02j m
As l, m, and j are finite, there exists a finite lower bound for . In the latter case,Y0
. Use (A2) to obtain the second-order derivative with respect to ,a bY p 0 Y0 0
2 L e Y 0 ′p bf(Y  e) 1 l m U (wa bY ) 0 0( )2 2Y j 0
m e Y L0[ ] f(Y  e) U(wa bY )U(w) .0 0 ( )2 2j j Y0
Optimality requires that . Because the second and third terms are both2 2 L/Y ≤ 00
zero, then or2 ′1 [l (e Y )m/j ]U (w) ≤ 00
2j 1 em
Y ≥  l , (A4)0 ( )′ 2m U (w) j
where the right-hand side is finite. Equations (A3) and (A4) jointly prove that isY0
finite.
(ii) .a bY 1 00
We start with the solution under the constraint . In this solution, orbp 0 a 1 0
(the contract becomes a fixed fee otherwise). The optimality requires thata bY 1 00
(i) and that (ii) in the neighborhood of the optimum. This2 2L/Y p 0  L/Y ! 00 0
means that the expression in the square bracket in (A2) is zero at the optimum and
is negatively sloped in the neighborhood of the optimum.
We then relax b such that and where is arbitrarily small. Since bb ≥ 0 b ! d d1 1
can only be trivially positive, there is little change in the solution, and then a
still holds. We further relax b such that and where isbY 1 0 b ≥ 0 b ! d  d d0 1 2 2
arbitrarily small. With a similar argument, we again have . Using thisa bY 1 00
strategy repeatedly, we argue that holds for any . The reasoning isa bY 1 0 b ≥ 00
the following. For any to be optimal, there must exist some value of ba bY ≤ 00
such that is optimal. For to be optimal, the expression ina bY p 0 a bY p 00 0
the square bracket in (A2) must be negative in the neighborhood of . Buta bY p 00
this cannot happen, because, as we relax b from any solution with a bY p  1 00
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(no matter how small  is), the square bracket must be zero and it must be negatively
sloped in the neighborhood of the optimum. Therefore, at the optimum, a bY (0
. Assuming continuity for the solution, the situation with at optimum0 a bY ≤ 00
would not occur. Q.E.D.
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) and as j .Y r e ap 0 r 00
(1) The first-order derivatives with respect to a and b are
 
L ′p f()d l U (wa bY )f()d 
a Y e Y e0 0
 
′ ′′m U (wa bY )f(Y  e) b U (wa bY )f()d , (B1) 0 0  Y e0
 
L ′p Yf()d l U (wa bY )Yf()d 
b Y e Y e0 0

′ ′ m[U (wa bY )Y f(Y  e) U (wa bY )f()d (B2)0 0 0 
Y e0

′′ b U (wa bY )Yf()d].
Y e0
From (A2) we know that as because otherwise. Then (B1)Y r e j r 0 L/Y ( 00 0
and (B2) can be approximated as follows:
 
L ′p f()d lU (wa be) f()d 
a Y e Y e0 0
 
′ ′′m U (wa bY )f(Y  e) bU (wa be) f()d , (B3) 0 0  Y e0
 
L ′p e f()d lU (wa be) f()d {b Y e Y e0 0
 
′ ′′m U (wa bY )f(Y  e) bU (wa be) f()d (B4) 0 0  } Y e0

′mU (wa be) f()d.
Y e0
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From (B3) and (B4),

L L ′p e  mU (wa be) f()d.
b a Y e0
As at the optimum, then . In other words, when j becomesL/b ≤ 0 L/a ! 0 ap 0
sufficiently small.
(ii) as .b r 0 j r 0
As j approaches zero, approaches either or 0. We compare these twof(Y  e) 0
cases. In the first case, . Clearly, . Obtaining from (A1)f(Y  e) r  Y r e L/ep 00 0
and solving for m gives

mp 1 (a bY )f(Y  e) b f()d0 0 [ ]
Y e0

′′ ′ 2 ′′#C (e) bU (w bY )f(Y  e) b U (wa be) f()d[ 0 0 
Y e0
′ 1( ) U(wa bY )U(w) f (Y  e)] .0 0
At the optimum, the denominator (the second factor) must be positive to satisfy the
optimality condition (the second-order condition for the agent’s choice of effort). This
requires the numerator (the first factor) to be positive, which in turn requires (a
. Because and , this inequality means .bY )f(Y  e) ! 1 f(Y  e) r  Y r e b r 00 0 0 0
Therefore, as , we havej r 0
Y r e and b r 0. (B5)0
In the second case, . If , then , which meansf(Y  e) r 0 Y  e 1 0 f()d r 0∫Y e0 0 0
(the contract becomes a fixed fee). But this would not happen. There must beW r w
, and so, . This means that the contract approaches a simpleY  e ! 0 f()d r 1∫Y e0 0
linear scheme where

b r 1 and f()d r 1 (B6)
Y e0
because .j r 0
We further show that, as , the scheme of (B5) dominates that of (B6). Whenj r 0
, the two schemes are equivalent. In the first scheme, . Definejp 0 b r 0 d p e1 1
. Then, as . Noticing that , we haveY d r 0 j r 0 ap 00 1
d 1
EU p U(w) f()d U(w b Y )f()d.a   1
 d1
The distortion because of production riskiness and unobservable effort can be explained
by
 
U(w b Y )f()d ! U (w b Y )f()d . (B7)( ) 1  1
d d1 1
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What matters to the principal is , while what matters to the agent (w b Y )f()d∫d 11
is . In the second scheme, . Defining , then U(w b Y )f()d b r 1 d p e Y∫d 1 2 2 01
d 2
EU p U(w) f()d U(w b Y )f()d.a   2
 d2
Similarly, the distortion can be explained by
 
U(w b Y )f()d ! U (w b Y )f()d . (B8)( ) 2  2
d d2 2
Since and , the distortion in (B8) must be larger than that in (B7). Thatb ! b d ! d1 2 1 2
is, scheme (B5) dominates scheme (B6). When , both (B7) and (B8) becomejp 0
equality and the two schemes are equivalent. Q.E.D.
Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) as .b r 0 j r 
Obtaining from (A1), setting , and approximatingL/b L/bp 0 U(wa
by the second-order Taylor expansion givesbY )
 
′ (e )f()d lU (wa be) (e )f()d[ 
Y e Y e0 0

′′ ′ bU (wa be) (e )f()d mU (wa bY )Y f(Y  e)] [ 0 0 0
Y e0
 
′ ′′U (wa be) f()d bU (wa be) f()d 
Y e Y e0 0

′′ bU (wa be) (e )f()d p 0.]
Y e0
Solving for b gives
 ′ (e )f()d lU (wa be) (e )f()d∫ ∫Y e Y e0 0
bp  ′′ [ ]U (wa be) l (e )f()d m (e 2)f()d∫ ∫Y e Y e0 0
′ ′[ ]m U (wa bY )Y f(Y  e)U (wa be) f()d∫Y e0 0 0 0
 . ′′ [ ]U (wa be) l (e )f()d m (e 2)f()d∫ ∫Y e Y e0 0
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With and , we have ′′ (e )f()d ! 0 U (wa be) 1 0∫Y e0
 ′ [ ]U (wa be) l (e )f()d mY f(Y  e) m f()d∫ ∫Y e Y e0 00 0
b !  ′′ [ ]U (wa be) l (e )f()d m (e 2)f()d∫ ∫Y e Y e0 0
 ′ l (e )f()d mY f(Y  e) m f()d∫ ∫Y e Y eU (wa be) 0 00 0
!  ′′ 2[ ][ ]U (wa be) l  f()d∫Y e0
′U (wa be) 1 
p  7 # (wa be) ′′U (wa be) (wa be) 
 (e )f()d mY f(Y  e) m f()d∫ ∫Y e Y e0 00 0
#  . 2 2[ ] f()d l  f()d∫ ∫Y e Y e0 0
Since the coefficient of relative risk aversion, R(wa be){[(wa
, can be roughly taken to be constant,′′ ′be)U (wa be)]/U (wa be) (wa
is limited, does not explode as changes, and as 2be) Y f(Y  e) Y  f()d r ∫Y e0 0 0 0
, then as .j r  b r 0 j r 0
(ii) as .Y r j r 0
Obtain from (A1). Set and in (B1). Then, we haveL/w L/wp 0 L/ap 0
 Y e0
′ ′1 f()d lU (w) f()d mU (w)f(Y  e)p 0,  0
Y e 0
or
Y e0
′ ′[ ]mU (w)f(Y  e)p lU (w) 1 f()d.0 

When , the left-hand side approaches zero as does the right-hand side, whichj r 
requires either or . When , clearlyY e Y e0 0′f()d r 0 lU (w) r 1 f()d r 0 Y r∫ ∫  0
. Below, we show that also implies that . Let in′ lU (w) r 1 Y r L/Y p 00 0
(A2). Then,
e Y0 [ ]mp l U(wa bY )U(w)(abY ).0 02j
When , the left-hand side approaches zero unless . As the right-handj r  Y r0
side approaches zero,
U(wa bY )U(w)0
l r 1. (C1)
a bY0
Then, equation (C1) and jointly means that or .′lU (w) r 1 a bY r 0 Y ra/b0 0
With , this means that . Q.E.D.b r 0 Y r0
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